role played by networks in individual and organizational outcomes. Recent research on social networks continues in this positive vein. For instance, showed that certain individuals exhibited a greater propensity to develop extensive social networks and in a follow-on study the same authors reported that individuals with extensive social networks were much more likely to set challenging personal career goals . Moreover, both studies showed that these relationships were robust across samples of subjects from individualistic (U.S.A.) and collectivistic (China) cultures.
* * * INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE * * *
In contrast to this apparent flood of important research on the benefits and related methodological issues related to social networks we take a strikingly different tack in this paper.
While we do indeed focus on the outcomes of social networks, the social network outcome of pressing concern to us in this work is global terrorism and terrorist activity. Ironically, a successful terrorist attack is the epitome of social network effectiveness, at least that of a terrorist network. This assertion is true particularly given that many of the recent terrorist attacks have been coordinated through Granovettor's "loose ties" embedded in a deeply shared and collectivist ingroup culture of animosity toward a well-defined outgroup (Schein, 2004) . Even the vernacular describing terrorist groups fits the social network frame -for instance, the social network literature refers to nodes and links, whereas experts in military intelligence circles have long referred to terrorist networks in terms of their component terrorist cells (i.e., nodes) and conduits (i.e., links).
Throughout this volume, our colleagues have made the case as to why terrorism and terrorist networks are an important business and societal concern, so we do not intend to restate that valid case here. As should be clear by now, terrorism impacts purely domestic firms and transnational organizations alike. Instead, our objective is to present terrorist activity in the context of social networks possessing common and systematically observable social network characteristics.
Based on this presentation, we then move on to outline a social network-based methodology for better understanding and perhaps predicting terrorist activity. This methodology is novel in that it adapts complex but tractable existing military simulation games to reshape the field of battle to reflect a terrorist and his or her terrorist network's perspective. It is our hope that the interplay of theory and methodology proposed here helps tomorrow's business and political leaders combat the insidious threat of terrorism to global and regional economic recovery and development.
An Emerging Theory of Terrorism as Dark Networks in Action
Social networks exist when people interact, when they form social ties (Salancik, 1995) . The preponderance of social network research falls into a category that Raab and Milward (2003) refer to recently as bright networks -that is, networks where the outcomes are considered beneficial for individuals, groups, businesses, and society at large. Dark networks, in contrast, refer to social networks where the network achieves its objectives but at great cost to individuals, groups, businesses, and social welfare. It would be unfair and untrue to say that no research relevant to dark networks has been undertaken. In fact, it is probably not surprising that academic interest in management/organized labor relations during the last century and the potential impact of labor unrest on business effectiveness spawned research which considered the role of social networks.
Among the earliest of such network studies is one documenting the emergence of conflict, changes in interpersonal networks, and an eventual strike by workers in an African garment factory (Kapferer, 1972) . Importantly, we are not equating labor unrest or labor action with global terrorism, but instead noting that Kapferer's (1972) work clearly shows how changes in social network structures predicted the destabilization of an ongoing business operation. In period 1 of his study circa mid-1964, Kapferer (1972: 174) noted how little leadership centralization existed among the African workers at one particular factory, as evidenced by a centralization score of .28. In social network terms, centralization essentially denotes, mathematically, the extent to which a network is centralized around one or a few central actors (Freeman, 1979) . The value varies between 0 and 1, and higher values denote greater activity or relationships around one to several central individuals. As such, the measure is both a practically useful and intuitively logical indicator of an important characteristic of social networks.
During period 1, senior workers in the African factory were unable to secure wage and work improvements despite their orchestration of organized walkouts. Consistent with the low centralization score of .28, Kapferer (1972) surmised that this failure was due to a lack of overall support from the many skilled and unskilled workers at the factory. However, seven months later in period 2, the workers' centralization score had jumped to .45, suggested that some central group of leaders had grown in terms of their influence as demonstrated by a greater number and centralization of social network ties. In Kapferer's terms, the African workers were now "more linked into a common set of interactional relationships " (1972: 180) . In reviewing Kapferer's (1972) early study, Kilduff and Tsai (2003: 15-16 ) also noted that the social networks documented in period 2 were also more multiplex in that they spanned more clusters in the factory, and hence further enhanced the power and potential influence of the senior labor leaders.
The notion of multiplexity of social ties implies that a link between two actors may serve multiple interests (Barnes, 1979: 412) , such as the case where two individuals are both friends and co-workers. The outcome of this more robust social network was the senior workers' ability to incite a strike in 1965 where the workers realized a £1 wage increase.
Again, we are not equating organized labor movements with global terrorist networks but instead aim to draw attention to an early, relatively neglected study of what business leaders at the time would likely refer to as a dark network, based on its effect on their business' operations and profitability. Complementing and at the same time complicating Kapferer's (1972) observation of the effects of centralization, is Granovetter's (1973) introduction of the notion of weak ties, and their power in furthering the influence of social networks on important outcomes. The weak ties concept was developed in the vein of bright networks, and suggests that relationships that are infrequent and distant can also allow individuals to benefit from social network membership as viewed by the achievement of their objectives. Though the weak-tie notion is most often invoked in contexts where such ties provide access to more diverse information sources and contacts. In contrast, strong ties are those typically characterized by Krackhardt (1992: 218-219) and others as relationships that are frequent, long-lasting, and affect-laden.
Dark Networks Compared to Bright Networks in Social Network Research
Social networks operate to further their members' objectives. In that sense, it is the members objectives and how they differ between bright and dark networks that requires us to adjust how we apply social network concepts in the context of dark networks. For instance, in bright networks the members are typically not fearful that their membership is known and may even be overt in highlighting it. An individual who is seeking a job or new knowledge will thus openly address the members of the network, make their intentions and network affiliations known, and in so doing attempt to broaden the reach and effectiveness of their social network. While it is true that some individuals may try to manage their network positions such that they are in positions of greater relative power (Burt and Ronchi, 1990) , ultimate network structure and membership are typically not hidden or covert.
In contrast, members of dark networks typically only want their membership in such networks known after the fact as seen in factional claims of responsibility of suicide bombings. And yet, given the nature of their clandestine activity terrorists are embedded deeply in social networks, albeit dark ones. While membership becomes public knowledge, the extant members go to great lengths to hide and protect the structure of the network so that future actions by network members are not thwarted. As a result, even though the social ties among dark members are highly affect-laden, a characteristic typically attributed to strong-tie social networks, the clandestine nature of their work typically leads members to foster a weak-tie structure, where each tie is multiplex in nature. Some key dimensions of social networks and their differing roles from bright and dark network perspectives are summarized in Table 2 . While this listing is far from exhaustive, the key point is that network constructs may play out very differently in bright versus dark network contexts. * * * INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE * * *
PROPOSED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Meta-Analysis
The research on social networks spans across disciplines in social sciences (anthropology, sociology, psychology, management, economics), and has been frequently conducted in recent years as we note above (see also Borgatti, 2005 to the point that some (e.g., Salancik, 1995) have even questioned the very existence of social network theory. Meta-analysis would quantitatively provide such answers for the first time in the social networks research literature. Meta-analysis is the only method to quantitatively examine a set of relationships across multiple studies. Meta-analytic technique has been described in detail elsewhere (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1995 ) and we will not repeat such content here. We will just note that our preliminary search identified over 3,000 studies on social networks that may be applicable to be meta-analyzed.
Experiments
The next question is: do meta-analytic findings that may be obtained apply to such idiosyncratic behaviors as terrorist activity? Such dangerous behaviors belong to the rare group of activities (e.g., punishment may be another) that cannot be purposely manipulated and then tested in the field settings (e.g., as one may do with, say, performance in organizations). However, social network attributes and terrorist behaviors can be manipulated experimentally in the laboratory.
Findings from such experiments may indicate if meta-analytic results regarding social networks apply to manipulated terrorist behaviors. An important aspect of these experiments would be to find an activity that may be conducive to studying and manipulating terrorist behaviors.
Recent research on teams (see Hollenbeck et al., 1998 Hollenbeck et al., , 2002 Johnson, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Ilgen, Jundt, & Meyer, 2006) has used a complex, dynamic computer simulation of military operations that we believe may also be used to experimentally manipulate terrorist activities. The complexity of this simulation is high. The simulation we suggest is a modified version of the distributed dynamic decision-making (DDD) operation developed for the United States Department of Defense for research and training purposes (for a more complete description of this simulation see Miller, Young, Kleinman & Serfaty, 1998, and Xu, Miller, Volz, & Ioerger, 2003) . The version of the simulation we suggest here (MSU-DDD) is customized for participants with little or no military experience. A graphical rendering of the simulation is provided in Figure 1 . Because this simulation has been described in detailed previously (Hollenbeck et al. 2002) , we provide only a summary overview here.
* * * INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE * * *
The job is that of military operation in which study participants must defend a certain area from incoming enemy targets. The task presents participants with a simulated representation of a radar screen encompassing the area they must defend. The participant has a "base" in the center of the area they must monitor and defend. In monitoring their area on-screen, participants can only "see" enemy vehicles in the area near their base. A portion of the area that must be defended does not have radar coverage, and approaching enemy vehicles cannot be detected in that area. In addition to base radar, subjects have access to four assets / vehicles of varying capabilities (tank, AWACS plane, jet plane, helicopter) which can extend radar capabilities beyond the base radar area and be used to destroy incoming enemy targets. Participants in the simulation must dispatch a vehicle with the right set of predetermined capabilities. For example, simulation sets as a rule that tanks have slow travel speed and a high level of firepower, while jet planes travel quickly but have the least firepower. Thus, study participants would achieve the best results by dispatching vehicles that can reach and then can actually destroy a target with the minimum required firepower in the shortest amount of time.
Two distinct capabilities are needed to successfully complete the task of keeping a protected area clear. First, participants need to use response speed to attack quickly and destroy incoming targets. The longer an enemy vehicle is allowed to stay near a participant's base area, the lower a participant's overall performance, as scored in this simulation. Second, participants must accurately identify, shoot, and destroy the enemy targets -breaking rules of engagement or hitting own targets ("friendly kills") results in lower performance, i.e., inaccuracy is penalized.
The roles in this simulation can be programmed (reversed) to have a terrorist/saboteur who tries to do harm (do opposite of desired activities described above) and who needs to be identified. 1 x 6 ANOVA in each sample can be used to identify under which of the six network attributes the terrorist/saboteur performance is the most effective. The same design can be used to identify under which of the six network attributes is the defense against terrorist/saboteur most effective.
Cross-Cultural Moderation
The United States is characterized as an individualistic culture, characterized, in short, by focus on self, individual actions, one's own benefits (House et al., 2004; Hofstede, 1980) . The first set of experiments would address the following question: if terrorists were to act (manipulated) in an individualistic culture (e.g., US study participants), would such culture characteristic, and if so how, moderate the meta-analytic results? The flip side of individualistic culture characteristic is collectivistic culture, characterized by focus on group actions, social interconnectedness, and communal good (Triandis, 2004) . Thus, we propose a second set of experiments to address the following questions: (a) if terrorists were to act (experimentally manipulated in the proposed simulation) in a collectivistic culture (e.g., with study participants from such cultures), would such culture characteristic, and if so how, moderate the meta-analytic results, and (b) how such results may be different from results we obtained in an individualistic culture? We propose examining individualism/collectivism culture characteristics as a moderator because terrorism is a global phenomena and these two culture characteristics have been shown to be moderators of many relationships (e.g., what works here may not work everywhere) (Trompenars, 1998) . 
CONCLUSION
We feel that the program of research we propose here has a potential to make a contribution to social network theory, and perhaps offer practical suggestions for a topic of social relevancebetter understanding and predicting terrorist behaviors. We believe that the proposed program of research based on social network theory offers a feasible set of academic and practitioner tools to study such idiosyncratic, clandestine, and hazardous to the public undertaking as terrorist activity.
Our objective was to emphasize the importance of social network theories and social network research methodologies to the study of global terrorism and its relationship with both purely domestic and transnational business organizations. To achieve this objective we used the contrasting lenses of bright versus dark social networks to show how social network structure and theoretical constructs might be viewed differently from a dark social networks perspective.
Building on this conceptual framework, we proposed specific methodologies by which social network may be empirically studied. Our hope is that this framework and analytical tool may foster future research and substantive progress in combating the global terrorist threat. Relatively easy to calculate active network through common network survey instruments (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) ; inactive network can be identified by asking members who is active and inactive in the network they have reported.
Since members desire to hide their membership in the network, the narrow and broadly-defined network size must be estimated based on socio-economic, geographic, cultural, religious, or political characteristics.
Density
This characteristic represents the degree to which each member of the network has ties to other members of the network. Mathematically this characteristic is captured in a matrix where the maximum number of ties are divided by the actual number of ties, with the maximum value being one. A value of one would mean that every member in the network knows every other member of the network.
Work using the density measure typically emphasizes the ideas of diversity of ideas versus behavioral integration. A dense network, values closer to 1, implies the group is fairly cohesive. Low density networks, values closer to zero, signify few common ties and thus diversity of information sources.
Dark networks will favor low density as a survival mechanism since high density would mean that any captured member could reveal a significant number of other dark network members.
Centrality
This characteristic can take on one of four potential values. Degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, or eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality means an actor has connections to many other actors in the network. Closeness centrality means the actor is connected to many other actors, but those other actors have few connections among themselves. Betweenness centrality is this latter feature which captures the degree to which an actors ties are linked to each other. Finally, eigenvector centrality captures the number of connections across centrally connected actors.
Most actors wish to have high degree and closeness centrality and, if they desire power, to also have low closeness centrality among their ties but at the same time have high eigenvector centrality.
Dark networks may strive to have common beliefs serve as substitutes for degree centrality and use indirect communications to achieve the benefits of betweenness and eigenvector centrality to coordinate their actions.
